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ABSTRACT. The business angel market is changing. Business angels are increasingly 
investing as part of organised and managed angel groups alongside other angels rather than 
on their own. This development has significant implications for research, challenging the 
traditional definition of a business angel, changing the characteristics of investments made by 
business angels, and transforming the way in which the investment process occurs. It also 
challenges the ongoing relevance of the existing body of angel research that has been based 
on studies of individual angels investing on their own. The research community has been 
slow to react to this change. The paper identifies a number of methodological issues and 
research priorities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Angel investing has been undergoing a transformation since the late 1990s from a largely 
invisible and atomistic market dominated by individual and small ad hoc groups of investors 
who strive to keep a low profile and rely on word-of-mouth for their investment opportunities 
to a more organised and visible market in which angel groups are becoming increasingly 
significant both in terms of total amount invested and size of investments - typically in the 
£250,000 to £500,000  range that were previously the prerogative of venture capital funds - and 
participating in much larger deals as co-investors in syndicated deals (Mason and Harrison, 
2015; Mason et al, 2016). These groups are managed, professional in their operation (albeit to 
varying degrees), with established routines for accessing deals, screening deals, undertaking 
due diligence, negotiating and investing. Most use online platforms to manage the investment 
process. As Edelman et al (2017: 397) comment:  “angel groups are changing the angel 
investment landscape.”  
 
Angel groups operate by aggregating the investment capacity of individual high net worth 
individuals (HNWIs). Some groups are member-managed while others are manager-led. This 
individual is often termed the ‘gatekeeper’ (Paul and Whittam, 2010). Their key roles are to 
undertake the initial screening of investment opportunities and to manage investor engagement. 
Groups have a limited and selective membership of angels (typically 20-75 members but some 
have over 100 members). There are a variety of organisational models. In one common model 
- the ‘dinner club’ model – members meet regularly to hear pitches by entrepreneurs who have 
been pre-screened by the group’s management team. Another is  the ‘core-periphery’ model 
which consists of a tight inner circle of lead investors who provide the central decision-making 
function alongside the ‘gatekeeper’ and lead the group’s investments, and a larger, outer ring 
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of semi-passive investors who are given the opportunity to invest alongside these lead 
investors. Another model involves the coalescing of members around an experienced angel 
who takes the lead role in an investment. Kerr et al (2014) describe the investment model of 
Tech Coast Angels, a well-known angel group in southern California.  Some larger groups – 
such as Tech Coast Angels,  Keiretsu and Go Beyond - operate on a Chapter model basis. In 
this model groups operate in several locations, in some cases in more than one country, under 
the same brand management, but each has its own gatekeeper, use standard procedures for 
generating deal flow, screening and due diligence, and run common training sessions, seminars 
and other events which build collaborate social relationships between members across the 
group.  
 
This changing nature of angel investing has fundamental implications for angel research. As 
recent reviews show (White and Dumay, 2017; Drover et al, 2017; Edelman et al, 2017; 
Wallermoth et al, 2018; Tenca et al, 2018), the research that has been produced over the past 
four decades on which our understanding of angel investing is based  derives from studies of 
solo angels operating independently and below the radar. But with the emergence of group 
investing this established knowledge base may no longer be relevant. For example, it is not 
clear whether angels who are members of angel groups are distinctive in terms of their 
characteristics or investment practices from solo angels. Furthermore, despite the growing 
importance and sophistication of angel groups as providers of capital, there is very little 
evidence on the impact that group membership has on the investment process of individual 
angels (Bonini et al 2018: 593). Research has been slow to respond to the changing nature of 
angel investing (Edelman et al, 2017; Tenca et al, 2018). For example, in their review of 148 
journal papers on business angels published between 1981 and 2015, Tenca et al (2018) identify 
just two papers on angel networks or groups. The literature on angel groups comprises a 
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handful of case studies (mainly written by practitioners) (e.g. May and Simmons, 2001; May, 
2002; Cerullo and Sommer, 2002; Payne and Mccarty, 2002; May and O’Halloran, 2003) and 
just a few scholarly studies (Sudek, 2006; Becker-Blease and Sohl, 2011; Gregson et al 2013; 
Carpentier and Suret, 2015; Mason et al, 2016; Croce et al, 2017) and some general discussions 
(Mason, 2006; Sohl, 2007; 2012). 
 
In this paper we reflect on the implications of the emergence of angel groups for research on 
business angels in this new era of organised angel investing. We start by considering the 
implications for how business angels are defined. This is followed by a discussion of data 
sources.  We then discuss the ways in which the investment decision-making process of angel 
groups differs to that of individual angels. Individuals still generally make their own investment 
decisions as members of angel groups but in the context of the group’s operating and decision 
making procedures and hence are potentially influenced by the gatekeeper and other group 
members. A key distinction between solo angels and angel groups is that a significant 
proportion of the investments made by angel groups are follow-on investments (Mason et al, 
2016; Mason, 2019). This follow-on investment decision – which is likely to be distinctive 
from the initial investment decision, not least because information asymmetries are reduced - 
has not been studied in an angel context. We consider how the post-investment stage differs 
between individual angels and angel groups. Finally, we suggest that the emergence of angel 
groups has implications for the funding escalator model of entrepreneurial finance.  
 
2.  THE EMERGENCE OF ANGEL GROUPS: SCALE AND DRIVERS 
The Band of Angels, which was founded in Silicon Valley in 1995, is generally – but 
inaccurately - regarded as the first organised group to be formed. Others, such as Tech Coast 
Angels (1997), Sierra Angels (1997), Common Angels (1997) and The Dinner Club (1999), 
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soon followed (Preston 2007). Archangel Investors, located in Edinburgh, Scotland, was 
founded in 1992, and so is older than these better-known US groups (Kemp et al, 2017). 
Between 1996 and 2006 the number of identifiable business angel groups in the US grew from 
10 to over 250 (Preston 2007). The Angel Capital Association, covering the USA and Canada, 
was created in 2003 for the purposes of knowledge sharing and transfer of best practice, 
research and data collection and representation of the angel community with policy-makers. 
ACA currently has more than 400 angel groups in its database.1 There has been a similar 
expansion in the angel market in Europe. The UK Business Angel Association (UKBAA) has 
49 angel groups as members.2 There are now examples of angel groups throughout the world 
(May and Liu, 2015; Lo, 2016; Harrison, 2017). There is also evidence of the specialisation of 
groups by industry sector (e.g. health care, clean tech), type of investor (e.g. women-only angel 
groups) and affiliation (e.g. university-based groups).  
 
The emergence of angel groups reflects the need for greater                                                                                    
financial resources to make larger investments, including follow-on investments.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Individual angels are rarely involved in making follow-on investments. Traditionally, 
companies that have exhausted their angel investment have had to seek further finance from 
venture capital funds. However, this puts angels in a vulnerable position, notably to dilution, 
on account of the different investment instruments used by venture capital funds. This is 
exacerbated by their inability to make follow-on investments. This vulnerability was painfully 
exposed during the dot.com crash era of the early 2000s when angels, as initial investors, were 
subject to down-rounds, cram-downs and write-offs of the investments that they had made in 
the dot.com boom at over-inflated values at the hands of venture capital funds. As a 
                                                          
1 https://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/faqs/  
2 The UKBAA has 160 members including accelerators and incubators, crowdfunding platforms, professional 
advisory firms, early stage venture capital firms  as well as angel groups and individual angels. 
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consequence, many angels have sought to avoid investing alongside venture capitalists (GP 
Capital, 2004; Mason, 2007). Moreover, the ability of individual angels to pass on their 
investee businesses to venture capital funds to make follow-on investments has declined as 
venture capitalists have shifted their focus to larger investments. The outcome is that angels 
have recognised the need to band together to create the ‘deep pockets’ needed to make both 
sizeable initial investments and follow-on investments.  In some specific contexts, such as 
Scotland (Harrison et al 2010; Gregson et al, 2013; Harrison 2017), policy-makers have sought 
to encourage the creation of angel groups, for example through specialist support agencies and 
the creation of co-investment funds, as means of addressing gaps in the supply of scale-up 
capital. 
 
Angel groups are also attractive to individual investors by enabling them to achieve more 
diversified investment portfolios (i.e. investing, say, £100,000 across five businesses alongside 
other investors rather than investing it in one business as a solo investor.) Gregson et al (2017) 
highlight the need for angels to make multiple investments in view of the high risk of such 
investments: their analysis demonstrates that “portfolios with more than 50 investments are 
required to significantly minimize risk of poor returns. …  Similar scale is [also] required to 
maximize returns potential, as smaller portfolios also have a lower average IRR”. Other 
benefits from joining angel groups include superior deal flow, enabling individual angels to 
invest in particular opportunities that they could never have invested in on their own, learning 
from other investors, providing more effective post-investment support, improving their own 
investment skills and social benefits from opportunities for camaraderie with like-minded 
individuals. 
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The emergence of angel groups is regarded as beneficial to the entrepreneurial ecosystem. First, 
they reduce search costs for both angels and entrepreneurs. Because of the fragmented nature 
of the angel market and the invisibility of angels there was no mechanism for them to receive 
a steady flow of investment opportunities. Instead, they found their deals by chance or through 
their own, often limited, social networks. The entrepreneur’s search for angel finance was 
equally a hit-or-miss affair. As a consequence, investors and entrepreneurs both incurred high 
search costs. This prompted many to drop out of the market as either suppliers or seekers of 
finance (Wetzel, 1981). Angel groups, in contrast, are generally visible and so entrepreneurs 
are able to approach them directly. A further source of inefficiency was that each investment 
made by an investor has typically been a one-off that was screened, evaluated and negotiated 
separately. Angel groups have been able to develop efficient routines for handling investment 
enquiries and screening opportunities and have developed standardized investment documents. 
Angel groups are also more focused on achieving exits than are most individual angels (Kerr 
et al, 2014 – but see Mason and Botelho, 2016,  for contrary evidence) 
 
Second, angel groups have stimulated the supply-side of the market. As well as being attractive 
to active angels they also offer considerable attractions for high net worth individuals (HNWIs) 
who want to invest in emerging companies but lack the time, referral sources, investment skills 
or the ability to add value  to be able to invest on their own.  . Without the opportunity to invest 
in emerging companies these investors will invest in other asset classes (e.g. stocks, bonds and 
other investment products, property) (Mason and Harrison, 2000). Moreover, such investments 
are likely to involve money being exported from local and regional economies whereas 
business angels typically invest locally (Avdeitchikova, 2009; Harrison, et al, 2010). Moreover, 
angels who are members of angel groups invest a higher proportion of their wealth than those 
who are not (Bonini et al, 2018). 
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Third, the ability of angel groups to add value to their investments is also much greater. The 
range of business expertise that is found amongst angel syndicate members means that in most 
circumstances they are able to contribute much greater value-added to investee businesses than 
that of an individual business angels, or even most early stage venture capital funds. Both Kerr 
et al (2014) and Lerner et al (2018) report that angel groups enhance the outcomes and 
performance of the firms in which they invest. 
 
Fourth, angel groups have become important investment partners with governments. In recent 
years Government intervention in the venture capital market has shifted from direct investment 
to models that involve collaborating with private investors, both to leverage their expertise and 
to eliminate the overhead costs of running their own investment funds (Murray, 2007; 
Jääskeläinen and Murray, 2007). One example is the creation by government of co-investment 
funds which invest alongside business angel groups, and in some cases early stage venture 
capital funds, matching their investment on a one-to-one basis, typically on a parri passu basis, 
to address the early stage funding gaps (Malcolm Watson Consulting, 2016; Owen and Mason, 
2017; Harrison, 2017).                                      
 
3. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES – WHO IS A BUSINESS ANGEL? 
Angel research suffers from definitional ambiguity and confusion (Mason and Harrison, 2008; 
Mason, 2016).  The emergence of angel groups has added to this. A key source of this 
ambiguity is that the terms ‘angels’ and ‘informal investors’ have often been used 
interchangeably.  However, they are not the same. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(GEM), for example, defines informal investors much more broadly to include investments 
from family, friends, acquaintances as well as ‘strangers’.  The term ‘angel’ defines high net 
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worth individuals who make their own investment decision, invest their own money, along 
with their time and expertise, directly in businesses in which they have no family connection, 
and, after making the investment, generally takes an active involvement in the business, for 
example, as an advisor or member of the board of directors (Mason, 2006). Definitional issues 
arise because some angel groups are structured in such a way that they attract new types of 
investors who play a much more passive role and hence do not meet these criteria. Specifically, 
they may not be actively involved in the investment decision-making process and they may not 
be a hands-on investors. Hence, paradoxically, it should not be assumed that all of the members 
of every angel groups actually meet the conventional definition of an angel investor.  
 
Further confusion arises on account of the various terms that have been used for collective 
forms of angel investing. These include groups, networks, portals, syndicates and associations.  
We use the term ‘angel group’ which we define as a consortium of individual angels who 
collaborate to manage deal flow and process deals together but make their own individual 
investment decisions. This point is critical:  angel groups are not pooled investment vehicles.3  
Management may be hired or provided by the group themselves, often as volunteers. Larger 
groups also have their own administrative staff. Angel groups operate with differing levels of 
formality and structure but all have an identity and name and most have a web presence (web 
site, Twitter, Facebook, blogs, etc). ‘Network’ has generally been used as shorthand for 
‘business angel networks’ (also termed as ‘business introduction services’), organisations that 
operate as mechanisms that connect investors with entrepreneurs seeking finance (Harrison and 
Mason, 1996). Bonini et al (2018) contrast networks with groups: compared to groups, 
networks have less stringent obligations and engagement rules on its members and provide 
                                                          
3 However, some angel groups have established investment funds alongside their direct investment  activity 
(e.g. London Business Angels: https://investment.newable.co.uk/)  
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little or no organised processing of investment opportunities, with individual members 
responsible for finding their own co-investors with whom they can share the due diligence, 
undertaking their own negotiations and producing their own term sheet. Sohl (2007) used the 
term ‘portal’, which carries an implication of on-line activity (an early example of which was 
the Small Business Adminstration’s ACE-Net electronic angel/entrepreneur matching service 
launched in 1996: Acs and Tarpley, 1997; other examples include Angel List (USA), Angel 
Investment Network, Angel’s Den and London Business Angels (all UK based)). ‘Syndicates’ 
refers to deals in which several independent investors come together to invest together in a 
specific company. ‘Associations’ is the term for a member organisation of angel groups (such 
as ACA, NACO, EBAN and UKBAA)4. Typically the membership of these organisations has 
extended beyond angel groups to include early stage venture capital funds, business 
accelerators, electronic funding platforms (including crowdfunding platforms) and other early 
stage market players (e.g. law firms) (see note 2). 
 
4.  DATA 
The emergence of angel groups is widely thought to overcome the data challenges that have 
traditionally confronted research because of their public profile and the visibility of their 
investments, in contrast to the invisibility of the vast majority of solo business angels and their 
investments.  We argue that this is not necessarily the case, with an over-reliance on data from 
angel groups creating potential new sources of bias in angel research. 
 
4.1 Sampling issues          
                                                          
4 ACA – Angel Capital Association; NACO – National Angel Capital Association (of Canada), EBAN – European 
Business Angel Network; UKBAA – United Kingdom Business Angel Association. 
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The invisible nature of business angel investing has created challenges for researchers, 
resulting in the use of ad hoc, convenience samples (Mason and Harrison, 2008; Mason, 2016). 
Angels who are members of groups are at least semi-visible to researchers (although may need 
the co-operation of gatekeepers to access them) and so offer a ‘sample of convenience’. As a 
consequence, several recent studies have drawn their samples of angels from the membership 
of angel groups, and in some cases from just one angel group. (e.g. Mitteness et al, 2012a; 
2012b; 2016; Kerr et al, 2014; Murnieks et al, 2015; Lerner et al, 2015; Carpentier and Suret, 
2015; Cardon et al, 2018)  But this begs the question whether angels who join angel groups are 
‘distinctive’? If so, then it may be problematic to extrapolate the findings from such studies to 
the entire angel market or to make comparisons with prior research based on solo angels. There 
is evidence that younger angels are more likely to join angel groups when they start investing 
whereas older angels - because there were fewer angel groups when they started their investing 
career - have only subsequently joined angel groups (Botelho, 2017). Moreover, excluding 
those who join women-only angel groups, women are somewhat less likely than men to be 
members of angel groups (Harrison et al, 2018). The generalisability of studies that are based 
on angels from a single angel group is particularly problematic on account of the heterogeneity 
of groups, with several that focus on distinct communities and have particular investment foci. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
A further concern arises from the use of snowball sampling which has been a common 
methodology to overcome the invisibility of business angels (Mason, 2016). As snowball 
surveys are based on the networks of an initial sample they may simply produce samples that 
are dominated by angels from the same group (and hence several individual respondents may 
be reporting on the same investments).  Hence, whereas the visibility of angels that has resulted 
from the emergence of angel groups might be seen as being beneficial to researchers, if those 
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angels who are members of groups are distinctive then it may not be legitimate to generalise 
the findings to the overall market, or even beyond the specific group context.  
 
4.2 Data issues 
A further apparent benefit for researchers arising from the emergence of angel groups is that 
their investments are now captured by various investment databases, such as Crunchbase, 
Pitchbook, CB Insights, Owler and Beauhurst. This enables researchers to undertake 
quantitative analysis of angel investing in a similar way to how venture capital fund 
investments have been analysed (e.g. Block et al, 2018; Croce et al, 2018), but yet again the 
limited coverage of this data raises concerns of biased coverage.  For example, only 17 of the 
21 Scottish angel groups listed on the LINC Scotland web site are included in the Crunchbase 
database.  More signficantly, the coverage of their investments is patchy. For example, 
Archangels a major Scottish angel group, has made 83 investments to 31 March 2017 (Kemp 
et al, 2017) whereas Crunchbase reports only 39 investments to November 2018. Discovery 
Investment Fund, another Scottish angel group, lists nine investments in its portfolio whereas 
Crunchbase lists only one investment.  
          
5. THE INVESTMENT DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
Business angel groups have transformed the investment process.  Research on how business 
angels make their investment decisions has identified various stages that are undertaken 
sequentially: (i) awareness of the investment opportunity; (ii) investor-specific screen, (iii) 
generic screening, (iv) detailed evaluation, (v) contract stage, (vi) closing, (vii) post-investment 
support,  (viii) exit (Mason and Botelho, 2018).  Solo angels undertake all of these stages 
themselves. However, the creation of angel groups has resulted in the emergence of a new actor 
– the group manager or ‘gatekeeper’ (Paul and Whittam, 2010). Their role varies between 
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groups but primarily they perform two functions. First, they perform external-facing roles, 
notably promoting the group and attracting deal flow. Second, they normally undertake the 
initial screening of investment opportunities. The individual group members then consider 
these pre-screened deals in more detail. 
 
There is considerable research on the investment screening stage (see reviews by Edelman et 
al, 2017 and Tenca et al, 2018). The process is rather different in angel groups where the 
gatekeeper normally undertakes the initial screening on behalf of the individual angels who are 
members of the groups. The question that arises from the involvement of gatekeepers is 
whether they perform the screening performance differently to that of solo angels.  An initial 
study suggests that there are differences (Mason and Botelho, 2017). First, gatekeepers are 
slower to say ‘no’. They spend longer than solo angels on the screening. Second, their screening 
is less personalized. Personal – often idiosyncratic – issues are prominent in the screening by 
individual angels (Harrison and Mason 2017). In contrast, the gatekeepers place considerable 
emphasis on the group’s investment criteria – these are typically few in number and dominated 
by industry sector, the size of the investment and the likelihood of future funding rounds being 
required. Within these constraints they are open to considering a wide range of opportunities, 
not least because of the collective expertise of the group that they can draw upon and their wide 
range of experience. Third, gatekeepers give considerably greater emphasis to the financial 
aspects of the proposal, not just in terms of the frequency of comments but also in terms of the 
issues raised, notably valuation, the need for future funding rounds and returns. Those 
entrepreneurs whose opportunities pass the gatekeeper’s screening might then be invited to 
pitch to the group.  Fourth, those opportunities that attract sufficient interest from investors will 
then be subject to due diligence that is typically undertaken by a small group of angels. 
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Another way in which the emergence of angel groups has changed the investment decision-
making process is that it provides individual angels with much greater exposure to the insights 
and opinions of others. This includes group interactions, the influence of other members of the 
group and the influence of gatekeeper (Figure 1). However, “people who interact with each 
other regularly tend to think and behave similarly” (Shiller, 1995). The growth of angel groups 
could therefore be leading to the emergence of a ‘community of practice’ (Lave and Wenger, 
1991) – a collection of practitioners who engage on an ongoing basis in the pursuit of some 
common endeavour. This ongoing engagement results in shared thinking  and the development 
of a repertoire of ideas, ways of doing and resources – experiences, stories, tools, ways of 
addressing recurring problems – and practices that are shared to a greater or lesser extent across 
members (Wenger, 2000). This, in turn, could result in a growing standardisation of investment 
assessment (Mason et al, 2017). 
 
Figure 1.Influences of gatekeeper and other investors on the investment decisions of individual 
angels (source: Mason and Botelho, 2014) 
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There is emerging evidence that membership of an angel group has a discernible effect of the 
investment decision-making of individual angels. Botelho (2017) concludes that membership 
of an angel group “is a discriminatory factor in decision-making cluster studies”. Specifically, 
angels who are members of angel groups make more investments than solo angels, their 
investments exhibit greater diversity, there is less consistency in their decision-making criteria 
and they exhibit greater learning effects. Bonini et al (2018) find that business angels who are 
members of angel groups have different investment practices compared with those who are not. 
 
Turning to later stages in the investment process, valuation and contracting have attracted very 
little research. As a consequence, there is no information on whether angel groups take a 
different approach to valuation than individual angels, whether they have different (more 
formal) contacts and contracts, and the types of investment instruments used.  
 
Angels are generally patient investors, although this is generally by default rather than intention 
(Harrison et al, 2016), reflecting the fact that most angels do not adopt an exit-centric approach 
to investing (Mason et al, 2015).  It might be expected that angel groups would take a more 
professional approach to investing which would involve being more exit-centric. Surprisingly, 
this assumption is challenged by the limited evidence available which indicates that most angel 
group gatekeepers are not any more exit-centric than solo angels (Mason and Botelho, 2016). 
 
6. FOLLOW-ON INVESTMENT  
Another way in which the emergence of angel groups has fundamentally changed the nature 
of angel investing is their greater financial capacity which enables them to make follow-on 
investment decisions. Indeed, as groups mature an increasing proportion of their investments 
are accounted for by follow-on investments (Mason, 2019). Evidence from Scotland – where 
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most of the angel groups are now mature - indicates that between 60% and 80% of angel 
group investments are follow-on (Mason and Harrison, 2015; Mason et al, 2016). These 
investments are critical in enabling its portfolio companies to scale. The follow-on 
investment decision has not been a focus for research. Surprisingly, this topic has also 
attracted very limited attention in the much larger venture capital literature (McCarthy et al, 
1993; Birmingham et al, 2003; Guler, 2007; Devigne et al, 2016), despite its frequency. 
However, it is fundamentally different from the initial investment decision   From an 
escalation of commitment perspective (Staw, 1976), once decision-makers make an initial 
decision to invest in a company the tendency is for them to become very committed and 
ignore subsequent information, particularly negative information when making a further 
decision to deepen the commitment. This has been identified in VC investing (Birmingham et 
al, 2013; Devigne et al, 2016).  
 
Business angels might be expected to be particularly susceptible to the escalation of 
commitment because of the patient nature of their investments, relationship approach with the 
entrepreneur and their ‘committed faith’ in the entrepreneur and business that goes back to 
the circumstances of the initial investment, normally at the start-up stage  when tangible 
evidence was usually lacking (Gregson et al, 2013). Key questions include the following. 
How is the follow-on investment decision initiated and by whom? What are the investment 
criteria – how have they changed from the initial investment decision: is the ‘jockey’ (i.e. 
entrepreneur) still critical, or has the ‘horse’ (i.e. business attributes) become more significant 
(Mitteness et al, 2012a; Harrison and Mason, 2017)? How often and in what circumstances is 
a ‘no’ decision made? How does the prior relationship influence – for good or bad – the 
follow-on investment decision?  And what biases and heuristics underlie the follow-on 
decision process (Harrison et al, 2015)? Can we identify individual characteristics linked to 
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escalation of commitment? And are angel groups more likely to invest alongside other 
investors in a follow-on round? 
 
A key consequence of the growth of follow-on investments is that it undermines the traditional 
‘funding escalator” that dominated the era of solo angels. Benjamin and Margulis (1996: 71) 
describe this relationship as follows: “It boils down to this. Angel investment runs the critical 
first leg of the relay race, passing the baton to venture capital only after a company has begun 
to fund its stride. Venture capitalists focus ... on expansion and later stages of development, 
when their contribution is most effective.”  Several studies provide empirical confirmation of 
this relationship (Freear and Wetzel 1989; 1990; Harrison and Mason, 2000; Madill et al, 
2005). For example, Freer and Wetzel (1990) who observed that “[angels] and venture capital 
funds play complementary rather than competing roles in the financing of NTBFs”, with angels 
investing earlier and smaller amounts than venture capital firms. However, Hellman et al 
(2017) find little evidence that businesses financed either by individual angels or angel groups 
go on to raise venture capital.  
 
It has been suggested that a new pattern of funding is emerging (Mason, 2018). Angel groups 
are typically not involved at the pre-start up and seed stages because they have a minimum size 
of investment below which it is uneconomic for them to invest. New sources of seed finance 
have emerged, notably accelerators and incubators as well as crowdfunding, to invest in pre-
start and start-ups. Angel groups invest at the next stage, typically co-investing with other 
investors, including other angel groups and public sector co-investment funds, to provide their 
investee businesses with sufficient financial runway to grow and exit.  Only businesses with 
significant financial needs would go on to raise further finance from venture capital funds. 
However, in some cases a round of venture capital might be raised prior to the exit, capitalising 
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on their greater expertise in achieving exits. The outcome is a bifurcation of the risk capital 
market, with angel groups now increasingly the only source of funding for new and emerging 
businesses seeking investments in the range £250,000 to £1 million (up to $1m in the USA: 
Sohl, 2012). One of the key research issues that arises from this new model of entrepreneurial 
finance is to understand the interactions between business angel groups and other investors, 
notably equity crowdfunding platforms (Wallmeroth et al, 2018), both those seed investors 
who have invested prior to the angel group’s investment and also those making follow-on 
investments. 
 
7. POST-INVESTMENT ROLES 
A key feature of business angels is that they provide ‘smart’ money, using their human and 
social to support their investee companies in a variety of informal and formal roles, including 
advice, mentoring and networking, as well performing specific functional roles and board 
members or chair of the board (Politis, 2008; 2016). In the angel group context several angels 
will have invested in a business. This raises various questions. Who undertakes these value-
added roles? Is it just one investor, and if so, how is this investor selected? Or do several group 
members contribute to hands-on activity? If multiple angels do invest then this has implications 
for the study of angel-entrepreneur relationships, which typically adopt a dyadic focus. If the 
group’s hands-on role is limited to a core group of angels, does this create band-width issues, 
which either limits their investment capacity or their ability to add value? Linking back to an 
earlier point on the types of individuals that angel groups attract, are all members of angel 
groups equally capable of adding value? Or, is it the case that angel groups simply attract 
“inexperienced wealthy individuals seeking a passive investment rather than active angels who 
can contribute value added to their investee businesses” (Sohl 2007)? How does the hands-on 
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contribution of angel groups compare with than of individual angels? And  do different models 
of angel group influence the type of value-added contribution? 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
The world that scholars study is dynamic. Too often researchers are slow to recognise change 
and adjust their research focus accordingly. The consequence is that the current stock of 
knowledge becomes increasingly divorced from the way in which practice is evolving. This is 
what is happening in business angel research. The knowledge base that has been built up over 
the past 40 years reflects almost entirely the study of individual angels who, for most of this 
period, operated below the radar, investing on their own or informally with a few friends and 
business associates, making their own investment decisions, investing small amounts of money 
per investment, drawing upon their own entrepreneurial experience to support their investee 
businesses, and adopting a fairly passive approach to an exit. However, the way in which angel 
investing has changed. Part of the angel market is now visible, and more structured and 
institutionalised, occurring through managed angel groups. This changes the nature of the 
supply of entrepreneurial finance, challenges the traditional definition of an angel investor, and 
changes the way in which the investment process occurs. In this paper we have argued that 
business angel research needs to address this changing context. We identify seven research 
priorities.  
 
First, angel groups have drawn new types of investors into angel investing. However, our 
profile of angels as late middle-aged men with an entrepreneurial background who make a post-
investment value-added contribution to their investee companies remains heavily influenced 
by research based on solo angels. A key priority, therefore, is research that provides a profile 
of the contemporary angel population, updating the ABC (attitudes, behaviours and 
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characteristics) studies that have been a prominent feature of angel research (White and Dumay 
2017).  
 
Second, from a methodological perspective, the changing nature of business angels means that 
it may not be appropriate to base research on samples drawn from angel groups (particularly 
samples from a single group) and assume that the evidence is comparable to prior evidence 
based on solo angels or can be generalised across the business angel population. 
 
Third, the implications of the emergence of angel groups on the supply of entrepreneurial 
finance needs to be assessed. This is generally regarded as a positive development, notably by 
attracting new investors and thereby expanding the supply of early stage finance. This is 
particularly significant in economically lagging regions which have a deficiency of experienced 
angel investors (a consequence of the low level of entrepreneurial activity in such regions). In 
such geographical environments angel groups provide a mechanism through which this 
expertise can leverage ‘dumb money’ from high net worth individuals which would otherwise 
be invested in less economically productive asset classes (Mason and Harrison, 2000).5 
However, concern has also been raised that the emergence of angels groups is resulting in the 
institutionalisation of angel investing, which is becoming more like venture capital funds or 
fund management companies, investing money from passive investors (Sohl, 2012). Indeed, 
some angel groups have established separate investment funds while others have evolved into 
fund managers (Gregson et al, 2013). This raises the question whether “the essence of angel 
investing being lost with the emergence of angel groups.”6   
 
                                                          
5 We are grateful to David Grahame, OBE,  Executive Director, LINC Scotland for this point. 
6 This was a comment made by an angel investor in an interview with the lead author. 
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Fourth, there is a need to capture the heterogeneity of angel groups, documenting both the types 
of angels they recruit and the various organisational and operational models, and the 
implications that these different models have on their investment activity. There is also a need 
to understand the evolution of angel groups – their membership, deal flow (including referral 
sources), investment focus, investment processes, post-investment support and outcomes. And 
are there geographical differences in the organisation and investment approach of angel 
groups? 
 
Fifth, there is a need to understand the different nature of the investment decision-making 
process and criteria of angel groups. Specifically, how much influence does the 
manager/gatekeeper have on the investment decision? What role do individual angels play in 
the investment decision. How is the investment decision made? Where are angel groups 
positioned on the market risk (the concern of venture capitalists) - agency risk (the concern of 
angels) spectrum (Fiet, 1995)?  
 
Sixth, what are the implications of angel groups for entrepreneurial finance policy? Tax 
incentives are predicated on incentivising individual investors, but this may constrain the 
investment decision making and modus operandi of angel groups. More recently, co-
investment funds – public sector investment vehicles that invest alongside angel groups – are 
emerging as a significant area for government intervention  (Growth Analysis, 2013; Owen 
and Mason, 2017; Bileau et al, 2017; Harrison, 2018).  However, there is only limited evidence 
on the variety of operating models of co-investment funds, approaches to evaluation (Murray 
et al, 2015) and impact.  
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And finally, what level of interaction do angel groups have with the growing number of other 
players in the entrepreneurial finance market, and what is the nature of such interactions? 
Specifically, to what extent are angel groups investing in businesses that have raised start-up 
finance from incubators and other providers of seed capital?  How much interaction do angel 
groups have with venture capital funds? And, what effect is equity crowdfunding, a potentially 
disruptive market innovation, having on the nature and role of angel investing? Specifically, 
how are angel groups interacting with equity crowdfunding platforms? What investment 
models are emerging (Saloman, 2019)? How does co-investing between angel groups and other 
types of investor occur? 
 
Angel investing has been and continues to be central to the development of an entrepreneurial 
economy across a range of geographies. As angel investing internationalises (Harrison 2017), 
especially into emerging economies (May and Liu 2016; Lo 2016), effective and relevant 
research and evidence-based policy making needs to be grounded in the new realities of 
business angel investing that we have described in this paper. 
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